Introduction
South Africa's non-racial democracy was established ten years ago following protracted constitutional negotiations over a period of four years. Though marked by much terrible violence, the transition was far from the racially charged civil war, insurrection or military coup, which had been widely expected. The advent of democracy in South Africa -and the agreement that it represented between the black and white populations to build a common future -carried high hopes for progressives not only in the country itself but around the world as well. This was partly linked to the international 'moment', coming at the time of the collapse of communism as well as in the wake of the 'lost decade' of development which the 1980s represented for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The hope was that Africa's biggest economy would not only address the yawning distribution gap between black and white within South Africa itself, but that it would also be able to pull the rest of the continent forward to reduce inequality between black and white nations at the global level. For South Africans, the new era appeared to offer the scope to build a new society, notwithstanding either the compromises needed to reach agreement on the Constitution or the still-substantial presence of the old social order within the political system or continued fears that the underlying settlement could fall apart in the face of concerted action from white or black die-hards.
Even with these caveats, for many the transition was to be regarded as a 'miracle', a description used by Nelson Mandela himself in his victory speech after the April 1994 election. And indeed it did have this dimension, as attested by the last-minute political 3 deals which allowed the election to go ahead, the all-out effort and commitment from thousands of people to overcome the logistical challenges, the many stories about human contact in election day queues. Ten years later, the 'rainbow nation' romance of the transition has faded and the miracle metaphor is evoked only infrequently. There is the occasional exception, such as the March 2004 opening of the permanent home of the Constitutional Court on the site of a former prison in which both Mandela and Gandhi had been held. But there is no longer any threat facing the constitutional order from diehards, whether white or black, and the survival of the non-racial regime is no longer in question.
In broadly assessing South Africa's democratic transition today, we use the characterisation 'fragile stability'. We do not of course suggest that this phrase fully depicts an obviously very complex reality, but for us it conveys the contradictory nature of the transition after ten years. On the one hand, the society is stable: a non-racial All of these problems have a gendered dimension -the statistics for women are much worse than for men. The poverty rate amongst female-headed households in 1995 was 60 per cent, double that for male-headed households, linked to the concentration of female-headed households in rural areas, which also have fewer working age adults.
Unemployment amongst women is higher -the national broad unemployment rate for women was 47.8 per cent in September 2003 compared with 35.7 per cent for men. The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for women is 12.8 per cent, compared with 9.5 per cent for men. Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual crimes and to domestic violence in the home, though young (black) men are more likely to experience violent crime and interpersonal violence in public places.
As these data suggest, apartheid's legacy remains deeply etched in society, together with the impact of the political transition, so that the new regime has not yet 5 been effectively embedded in a non-racial and democratic post-apartheid social order.
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Existing social fractures -faultlines -have been maintained or deepened, and new fractures created, as the emerging state has interacted with social forces and struggled to impose itself on the populace. Ties and linkages between state and society remain uneven in breadth and depth, and there remains considerable potential for stability to break down or evolve into stasis. For these reasons, we suggest that 'stability' needs to be qualified as 'fragile', in the sense that while these social fractures persist, there is potential for increasing instability which could move the society away from its tenuous equilibrium.
In elaborating this characterisation, it is worth starting from two common approaches to analysing South Africa's transition. The first involved the transfer of the 'miracle' metaphor from political rhetoric to scholarly analysis, as in much academic discussion in the early years after 1994. This implied that the transition defied explanation, or more precisely, that South Africa's racial divide set it apart as a special case, in that a dominant racial minority was willing to surrender its exclusive hold on power even though it would not regain it via the ballot box while the previouslysubordinated majority was willing to include the minority in government. Implicit here is the idea that race is a 'primordial' social fracture which should have made compromise impossible and -most important from our vantage point today -which would make democratic consolidation unlikely, since the latter would require 'national unity' or a 'single culture' to overcome racial differences.
9
The shortcomings of race-based structural analysis in the face of subsequent political developments may be thought to enhance the pertinence of a second common perspective on South Africa's transition, which suggests (based on common analyses of Southern Europe and Latin America) that South Africa was a 'textbook' case of democratisation via pacting. The implicit argument in this approach is that structural factors such as race are secondary compared with the dynamics of negotiation which 6 depend on the capacity of political actors on both sides of the divide to establish a compromise. 'Reformers' in the ruling group and 'moderates' in the democratic forces look for common ground to isolate 'hardliners' and 'radicals'. Successful transition involves constituting a democratic order and then consolidating it through repeated successful elections on the basis of the agreed constitution, signaling acceptance by citizens and political actors of 'contingent consent' as the underlying principle of political power.
10
In the 'transitions', consolidation faces a potential threat from hardliners attempting to restore the old authoritarian order, which can only be prevented by stabilisation of the democratic regime. The argument emphasises the compromises which anti-authoritarian moderates feel compelled to offer ruling group reformers to persuade them to commit to the new constitutional order. A more critical version of this argument has been widely applied to South Africa, arguing that white and black elites reached agreement on a non-racial state structured on liberal democratic principles which would reinforce their elite status. During the consolidation phase, the priority has been to stabilise the centre-ground to prevent a relapse to authoritarianism via hardliner resurgence which in turn required forestalling more far-reaching transformation via radical mobilisation. As a result, post-apartheid policy has been primarily concerned with elite advancement.
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The articles in this special issue -most presented at a workshop at Wits University 14 At the time of transition, the South African state was 'weak' in that it had limited ability to organise and exercise power for the 'centralised, institutionalised, territorialised regulation of many aspects of social relations'. 15 This is true 'by definition' because the state was unable to prevent the transition from apartheid authoritarianism to non-racial democracy: though it was able to avoid being overthrown and force a negotiated 12 In fact, a major weakness of the transitions literature is that it is too narrow in defining the interests of the actors simply in terms of the negotiation process (as moderates, reformers and so on). This 'underspecifies' the actors by ignoring the ways in which interests are shaped and constrained by social factors such as the composition of their support base, organisational pressures and economic opportunities or difficulties. 13 Migdal, 'The State in Society'. 14 This is not to suggest that social fractures can be made to disappear, but rather that they can be 'contained' for extended periods, that is, expressed in ways that do not threaten the wider social order. We are using institutions here in the 'Northian' sense, in other words, implicit codes and norms of behaviour distinct from organisations. Note also that normative concerns -whether or not an institutional framework which achieves stability also produces equity -are distinct, since equity (whether of resource distribution, voice or opportunity) may be sufficient for stability but it is not necessary. It is quite possible to imagine a 'low-level' equilibrium which is stable in that there are no dynamic forces to move society away from it, but is inequitable in fundamental respects. 15 tax base. 23 Although the eligibility criteria for pensions and other social grants were widened and their levels increased, many people simply did not receive money to which they were entitled because the delivery system was inefficient, corrupt and geographically restricted. This was especially true in rural areas where delivery relied on 'homeland' administrations.
The state's limited capacity meant that policymaking relied very heavily on nonstate actors. During the transitional period, a plethora of multipartite fora were established which formulated policy frameworks across a wide range of issues: in mid-1993, there were fifteen sector-based forums, seven regional forums, five serving metropolitan areas and several dozen at local level. These bodies reflected a need to legitimise new approaches to policy by involving organisations and groups whose members had been denied rights under apartheid. But in many cases the lack of capacity within the state to formulate and implement policy documents, proposed legislation and regulations, meant that even these bureaucratic tasks were carried out by forum participants with mandates extended beyond policy approval or by consultants, whose role in policy increased markedly.
During the second half of the decade, public agencies have been transformed or established, enabling the state to enhance its management and regulatory capabilities in exercising its basic functions including policing, border control and taxation. Together with significant improvements in its capacity to formulate policies and deliver social grants to the poor, these have contributed substantially to regime stabilisation. by those who feel excluded from the state.
However, the ANC's dominance has, at the same time, reinforced race and nationalism as the central ideas for political mobilisation, so that the political expression of voice based on socio-economic interests is discouraged. not offer socio-economic interest groups the prospects of winning state power and the policy influence that would offer, which in turn would provide these groups with incentives not only to participate actively in the party political process, but also to assume risk in making long-term commitments of resources. Uncertainty about the ANC's longrun policy stance arising from the long-running clash over GEAR within the alliance has impacted on the confidence of investors, both firms and households though of course responsive strategies of rich and poor have differed. 36 Ballard et al. 37 argue that a wide array of social movements can substitute for competition amongst political parties by increasing the uncertainty of outcomes of political competition, so that social movements contribute to democratic consolidation.
This may be true in relation to policy outcomes within individual arenas where social movements contest for domination with state or other non-state actors. But without the possibility of aggregation across social arenas through the mechanism of a political party or movement, uncertainty cannot be institutionalised in relation to state power, which is the sense in which it is used by Przeworski, 38 that is, control over the legitimate use of force and authority throughout territorial boundaries and across multiple social arenas.
Many arenas have no presence of social movements, indeed it is hard to imagine them in certain arenas such as macro-economic policy. 39 On the other hand, an array of separate social movements in different arenas could lead to dispersed domination (in Migdal's terms) which also would be destabilising. In sum, a strong and diverse civil society, including social movements, complements political competition and thus requires contending parties if it is to play a role in reinforcing the social order -in South Africa, the absence of alternative parties undermines the civil society role and maintains fragility.
We turn next to race relations, an issue which casts a long shadow over much of the discussion, even though it is not directly addressed by any of the articles. 40 the project of stabilising the new regime and countering possible threats from the 'old order' has been a human rights discourse emphasising individual equality and rights and sidelining issues of race and ethnic difference. In the constitutional negotiations, the National Party's efforts to protect (race and ethnic) 'group rights' were defeated in part through the promotion of individual rights, which could conveniently be based upon the ANC's Freedom Charter and subsequently became central within the Constitution.
41
In the nation-building project which was at the heart of his presidency, Nelson This will make the next step -to build effective state-society linkages around service delivery in rural areas -all the more difficult.
51
As with race relations, black economic empowerment (BEE) has both contributed to stability but also undermined it. BEE and employment equity (affirmative action) were key elements of the "implicit accommodation" between the ANC and white big business which emerged shortly into the constitution period of the transition, reflecting a tradeoff between maintaining macro-economic stability and accepting globalisation on the one hand, and transferring economic power to blacks on the other. implementing and monitoring sectoral charters will deepen state-society linkages, but it remains to be seen how successful they will be in widening BEE's social reach. The transfer of shares by large corporations has clearly accelerated since early 2003, but the involvement of the same handful of black business leaders in deal after deal across multiple economic sectors has simply emphasised the narrowness of the process (in both racial and gender terms) and limited its stabilising impact. Neither government nor the private sector has yet resolved the challenge of embedding BEE in a process of economic growth, which would broaden its distributive benefits. At the same time, the focus on BEE within established white corporations has meant that small business policy to support the emergence of a class of black entrepreneurs in production has not been high enough on the political agenda to have received adequate policy resources.
The articles by Cock and Hyslop deal in different ways with the changes in the civil service as a result of the transition. In their discussions of militarism and corruption, both emphasise the continuities from the old order to the new, while showing how the transition has re-configured these continuities, leading to both stabilisation and fragility.
As with BEE, the transition has created new resources -political and administrative influence -for other strata within the 'black middle class', including civil servants from the former 'Bantustans' and liberation movement members now public servants or SANDF soldiers. Hyslop's description of how some have used these resources in corrupt ways and Cock's account of the remilitarisation process both imply that the transition had an uneven impact within these strata, giving some an interest in maintaining the new status quo while creating potentially destabilising elements by denying access to others.
There are important links between their accounts, with Hyslop showing how the covert elements of the apartheid security apparatus left unsupervised in the last years of the old regime engaged not only in a 'dirty war' against the political opposition but also became deeply involved in corruption and personal enrichment, while Cock shows that many of these same people are now amongst the (white and black) soldiers excluded from the new SANDF and marginalised economically, leading them towards activities as mercenaries, criminals or, at best, private security guards.
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We turn now to macro-economic policy which has been characterised by distinct stabilising and destabilising policies. Government (especially since 2001) has repeatedly trumpeted its success in achieving stability, arguing that the policy focus should shift to 'micro-economic' issues, such as lower costs of services (energy, transport, telecommunications) and labour skills and productivity. In fact, some elements of macro- 'we need the state as the organiser and facilitator of public goods, for the distribution of public goods and access to public goods'.
Comment [JE5]:
Some of the sentences here made no sense as they were previously. Please check changes for sense. Seems a bit convoluted?
In its own review of the decade since 1994, the South African government itself acknowledged its limited infrastructural capacities, pointing out that 'there are weaknesses … at the coalface of interaction with the public and in the supervision and management of implementation … The state has made significant progress … in improving policy co-ordination … [but] these efforts need to be further consolidated with greater attention focused on implementation.' 61 The contrast between 'good' formulation of policy and 'poor' implementation in a wide range of arenas has been a common refrain since 2001. 62 Leaving aside the question of whether policy which cannot be implemented in its intended context should be regarded as 'good' policy, this distinction is less about the quality of public servants than about the state's ability to mobilise non-financialhuman and organisational -resources, and especially its inadequate linkages with social organisations to support citizens' consumption of public goods and services.
The democratic South African state has been far more successful in delivering public services which supplement current incomes by providing cash or in-kind services than those involving the creation or transfer of assets. 63 The former -cash grants, free water rations and so on -make fewer demands on the capacities both of the state as provider and of citizens as recipients, because they involve regular but small transfers from public agencies to individual citizens with anonymous brief direct contact. By contrast, programmes which build or transfer assets, such as land reform, education or housing, require ongoing and substantial contact between public service providers and the citizenry, who usually need to be organised into 'communities' to enable collective consumption of the service. In other words, the 'demand side' of public service delivery, the 'society' with which the state must link, must itself be constructed. The difficulties associated with doing this have been noted in housing and education, 64 and are illustrated in this special issue by two articles on land reform.
Both the Doornkop farm in Mpumalanga, which is the focus of the article by James, Ngonini and Nkadimeng, and the St Lucia Eastern Shores land claim, briefly presented in Walker's article, underline the fact that 'communities' are shot through with divisions and differences over socio-economic factors, both class and ethnicity, as in Doornkop. These articles also underline the simultaneous contradictions within the state, implicitly pointing to differences in incentive structures between public officials at national and at local levels, and between local politicians and bureaucrats. At the national (and provincial) level, the metric of success in public delivery of goods and service is quantitative (perhaps unavoidably). Time horizons are linked with electoral cycles so that 'community development' (a slow process prone to failure) is undervalued and distributional choices amongst conflicting groups a more abstract issue than for locallevel officials whose success is threatened when confronted with demands from specific groups 'at the barricades'. Local-level politicians may focus on a 'numbers game' within the (locally) dominant political party, but ethnic and local ward considerations involve calculations distinct from proportional representation at national level, as James and her co-authors show. Local civil servants, both administrative and law enforcement personnel, have a strong interest in building communities and maintaining order -which in the long term would sustain democratic consolidation at the national level -but they often lack the clout to override political objectives or else lack the resources (financial, human and organisational) to achieve these goals, especially in rural areas and marginalised urban settlements.
Conclusion
Drawing on a 'state-in-society' framework, we have emphasised the importance for democratic consolidation of the state's ties with society, both at the national level and in more localised contexts, societally and geographically. The 'case studies' presented in the articles suggest that the post-transition path is not short, smooth or direct. In contrast, politics, policy, and institutional change in South Africa during the past ten years have 29 limiting' in this fashion, the dynamics of crisis development depend both on the emergence of oppositional political organisations and the strategic responses of the dominant political organisation.
Equally unlikely is any imminent shift towards a stable high-level equilibrium.
Giving top priority to a coherent strategy for promoting equity and reducing poverty is certainly the aspiration of the 'two economies' concept that has been promoted very actively since the 2004 election campaign, including by President Mbeki personally. But meeting these aspirations would involve fundamental changes to the economic policy framework for growth and distribution which has been in place during the past decade.
This would also depend on the emergence of a self-consciously pro-poor political party linking social forces to state authority, since any such policy shift would certainly be opposed (or at least not supported) by business and the middle classes, both black and white, all of which have a strong interest in status quo policies on the macro-economy and Black Economic Empowerment.
Thus, notwithstanding the contradictory pressures -stabilising and destabilisingwhich emerge from the current trajectory of consolidation, 'fragile stability' represents a stable equilibrium position. But 'fragility' also implies impermanence: this equilibrium cannot persist indefinitely because South Africa is a dynamic society still in transition.
Incremental changes continue in all arenas and at all levels of society, and over time these are likely to add up to changes in the social structure which could shift the political balance of forces sufficiently to move the society out of its temporary equilibrium as a new organisational constellation and policy framework emerge. An exogenous shock, triggered by regional or global problems, for example, could speed up the process. It cannot be predicted whether such a shift, if it occurs, would be towards a 'high-level' equilibrium in which individual welfare and collective power are increased significantly, or towards crisis and possible social disintegration. There is no guarantee that the democratic transition will lead ultimately to democratic consolidation.
Postscript, August 2005
This Single-party dominance has contributed to stabilising a non-racial political regime but by restricting the political 'voice' of social groups has also hampered the evolution of state-society linkages to consolidate substantive democratic processes. The Zuma crisis encapsulates fragile stability in the same way, reflecting simultaneously a maturation of the ANC from struggle-oriented liberation movement to 'modern' political party supportive of 'good governance', and a reinforcement of centralised, proto-authoritarian tendencies within the organisation and a step backward for the emergence of the classand interest-based politics which must become a fundamental feature of state-society 31 interaction if a stable 'high-level' equilibrium is to be established. In the conclusion to the Introduction, we noted that a move away from 'fragile stability' to either of the two alternatives -state collapse or full-blown democratic consolidation of state and societywould require new organisational expressions in South African politics. But there is no indication that the present fracas will produce this outcome -the focus of the opposition within the alliance remains winning state power by taking over the leadership within the ANC, rather than winning state power from the ANC.
